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Interactions Between Cultural and Economic Determinants of Divorce in The Netherlands
This study examines the relationship between gendered family roles and divorce in The Netherlands. Cultural and economic aspects of this relationship are distinguished. Economic hypotheses argue that the likelihood of divorce is increased if women work for pay and have attractive labor market resources. Cultural hypotheses argue that divorce chances are increased if women adhere to emancipatory norms, independent of their labor market positions. An event-history analysis of a life-history survey among 1,289 Dutch women reveals evidence for both hypotheses.
Interaction effects are found as well: The protective effect of a traditional division of paid labor is only present among couples in which wives have traditional gender attitudes. Hence, the validity of economic explanations of divorce is conditional on cultural values.
As in most other modem industrialized societies, there has been a strong increase in divorce in The Netherlands over the past decades. The increase started in the mid-1960s and ended in the mid-1980s. In those two decades, the annual number of divorces rose from a low of 2 per 1,000 married men to a high of nearly 10 per 1,000 married men. The last 10 years for which data are available reveal fluctuations in the rate, but divorce remains high and there are no signs of a trend reversal. From a cohort perspective, the trend in divorce is even more pronounced (Table 1) . Divorce increased from 2% after 5 years of marriage for couples married in 1960 to about 13% for couples married in the early 1990s. Life table extrapolations show that in The Netherlands, one out of every four contemporary marriages will eventually end in divorce, which is high by any standard (De Jong, 1999) .
Several explanations have been offered for the increase in divorce. In this study, we focus on one explanation: the changing roles of men and women in society. The explanation of divorce in terms of women's and men's roles has both economic and cultural dimensions. From an economic perspective, gendered roles have changed in several important respects. Women have closed the gap in market resources; they now attain similar levels of education as compared to men and participate increasingly in the labor market (although in The Netherlands, primarily in part-time jobs [De Graaf & Vermeulen, number increased to about 50% in the 1990s (Van der Lippe & Van Doorne-Huiskes, 1995) . The redistribution of paid labor among men and women has been accompanied by a cultural shift in norms and values. Hand in hand with long-term processes of secularization and individualization, The Netherlands has experienced a considerable shift toward emancipatory attitudes, particularly among women. Normative acceptance of the traditional subordinate role of women has disappeared, and the virtues of gender equality and women's independence have received increasing support. Data on gender attitudes in The Netherlands show a steady movement toward more egalitarian attitudes since 1970, the earliest point of measurement (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 1994) . These trends closely follow the pattern observed in the United States (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001 ).
In short, the gender revolution is both economic and cultural in nature. This revolution occurred in exactly the same period as the rise in divorce, and often has been considered an important cause of rising divorce. In this article, we present hypotheses concerning the link between gender differentiation and divorce, and we develop hypotheses about how divorce probabilities depend on the interaction between the economic and cultural dimensions of gendered family roles. We test these hypotheses using individual-level data on divorce in The
Netherlands from the 1950s to the 1990s.
By presenting Dutch data, we hope to say something about the Western European case in a general sense. Divorce in The Netherlands in the 1980s was as common as it was in France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria (Goode, 1993 European countries, they have yet to begin.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

Hypotheses
Sociologists have long theorized that changing economic roles of men and women, particularly a change in the direction of less gender segregation, would undermine the stability of marriage (Cherlin, 1992; Parsons, 1949) . Economists later presented similar arguments and have suggested that female labor force participation is the driving force behind the decline in fertility, the decline in marriage, and the rise in divorce (Becker, 1981) . This notion has become dominant among both economists and demographers in recent decades, and has thus far received mixed support in micro-and macro-level analyses of demographic behavior (for a review, see Oppenheimer, 1997) .
The basic premise of the explanation is that the benefits of marriage largely derive from task specialization, and that such benefits decline when married women begin participating in the labor market. These are not the sole benefits of marriage, of course, but as long as decreases in the benefits arising from specialization are not compensated by increasing marital benefits in other domains, the hypothesis remains a good candidate for explaining the increase in divorce. The specialization hypothesis is augmented by another economic hypothesis: If women have their own incomes, or have sufficient labor market experience to be able to enter the labor market if they wish, they are in a better position to leave an unhappy marriage and are probably less motivated to work out marital problems (Cherlin, 1979) . Economically independent women can afford to evaluate their relationship and to take action if that evaluation turns out negative. Similarly, a husband probably feels more comfortable leaving a marriage if his wife is better able to support herself. Hence, a weakening of market specialization through women's labor force participation reduces both the gains from marriage and the costs of leaving a marriage. Note that a wife's paid work also may have a negative effect on divorce because it increases the couple's income, and a high income is generally believed to foster marital stability. This is the so-called income effect of wife's employment (Hannan, Tuma, & Groeneveld, 1977; Ross & Sawhill, 1975) . The specialization hypothesis also can be applied to marriages in which the man cannot fulfill his role as breadwinner.
Marital stability may be weakened especially when men are not able to find stable employment South & Spitze, 1986 Although the economic framework is elegant and persuasive, it is unlikely that economic considerations comprise the sole trigger for separation. Cultural norms and values play a role in this decision as well, and attitudes about family roles are especially important in this respect. Women with egalitarian views put greater emphasis on autonomy so that they are probably more likely than traditional women to believe in their abilities to establish independent households. Emancipatory women also are more tolerant toward alternative forms of family living and are less likely than traditional women to believe it is morally wrong to leave a husband when a marriage is unhappy (Lueptow, Guss, & Hyden, 1989; Lye & Biblarz, 1993) . Over and above these lower thresholds to divorce, women's emancipatory attitudes may lead to tension between spouses because women with these attitudes are less likely to take traditional roles for granted, and more often will discuss family tasks with their husbands (Amato & Booth, 1995; Greenstein, 1995; Lye & Biblarz Becker, Landes, & Michael, 1977; Brines & Joyner, 1999; Cherlin, 1979; D'Amico, 1983; Hiedemann, Suhomlinova, & O'Rand, 1998; Tzeng & Mare, 1995) . Some studies do not find positive effects of wives' labor market resources (e.g., Greenstein, 1990; Hoffman & Duncan, 1995; Sayer & Bianchi, 2000) , but the number of negative studies is smaller and most rely on income resources. When focusing on employment measures, even the less supportive studies find positive evidence (Greenstein) . Effects of the wife's education-the usual proxy for human capital--on divorce are generally not positive (e.g., Ono, 1998; South, 2001; South & Spitze, 1986) .
Although less research has been done in Europe than in the United States, the number of European studies has increased significantly in the 1990s, with studies in Great Britain, Sweden, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The evidence in this context is mixed, however.
Some studies yield supportive evidence (e.g., Babka von Gostomski, Hartmann, & Kopp, 1998; De Graaf & Kalmijn, 1999; De Rose, 1992; Fokkema & Liefbroer, 1998; Wagner, 1993) , whereas others present negative or inconsistent evidence (e.g., Berrington & Diamond, 1999; Corijn, 1998; Manting, 1993; Pit & Rouwendal, 1994 ). Women's educational effects are not always supportive of the economic hypothesis (e.g., Diekmann & Klein, 1991; Hoem, 1997; Manting) , but that is true in the United States as well.
That European evidence is mixed often has been linked to the role of the more generous welfare state, and this applies in particular when making comparisons between the United States and The Netherlands (Esping-Andersen, 1999).
Most divorced women in The Netherlands are able to be economically independent because they can rely on welfare payments. Individuals in The Netherlands with no personal income and who do not live with a partner who has an income can obtain welfare payments. Welfare payments may be low, but are high enough to maintain a normal standard of living. People on welfare generally must be active in finding paid work, Studies on the cultural aspects of gendered roles are scarcer and have so far been done primarily in the United States. Studies focusing on actual divorce show that, in contrast to our hypothesis, women with progressive gender attitudes are not more likely to divorce than traditional women (Greenstein, 1995; Kaufman, 2000; Sayer & Bianchi, 2000) . Other studies use more subjective indicators, such as marital quality and satisfaction. These studies mostly apply a crosssectional design and find positive evidence for the hypothesis that nontraditional attitudes among women are associated with greater perceived instability (Amato & Booth, 1995; Lueptow, Guss, & Hyden, 1989; Lye & Biblarz, 1993 ). The picture is complicated, however, because there are also indications that effects are different for men. For men, sometimes it is found that egalitarian gender attitudes are associated with more stable or more satisfactory marriages (Amato & Booth; Kaufman; Sayer & Bianchi) .
The interaction hypothesis has been studied as well, but the results thus far are not convincing.
In a cross-sectional analysis of marital quality, Vannoy and Philliber (1992) relate wife's employment and occupational status to gendered role expectations of husbands and wives. They show how effects of such expectations differ between employed and nonemployed women, but do not show how wife's employment effects vary between traditional and nontraditional couples, which is what our hypothesis discusses. In an analysis of divorce, Sayer and Bianchi (2000) test whether the effects of the wife's relative income vary with her gender ideology, but they do not find a significant interaction effect. Greenstein (1995) also studies actual divorce and relates wives' working hours to their gender attitudes. He finds that wives' working hours have a stronger positive effect on divorce when women are nontraditional, which contradicts our hypothesis. The interaction effect of wife's relative earnings and gender attitudes, however, reveals the opposite pattern (Greenstein, p. 39) .
More indirect evidence comes from a study by South (2001) , who presents the hypothesis that the effect of wife's employment may have declined over time. In motivating this expectation, South relies on the same interaction between cultural and economic mechanisms discussed previously. In the words of South, "with the recent redefinition of gender roles and, in particular, the increased acceptance of married women's employment, wives' labor force participation is perhaps less likely to create the sorts of marital strains that can lead to divorce" (p. 228). Empirically, South tests the hypothesis by examining interaction effects of wife's employment and historical time. In contrast to the interaction hypothesis, he finds an increase in the effect over time, instead of a decrease. Studies outside the United States, however, have found that the destabilizing effect of the wife's employment has decreased over time (Beck & Hartmann, 1999; Bracher, Santow, Morgan, & Trussel, 1993; Poortman & Kalmijn, 2002; Wagner, 1993) , thereby lending indirect support for our hypothesis.
Other indirect evidence comes from a comparative study of divorce in Italy, Germany, and Sweden. Blossfeld, De Rose, Hoem, and Rohwer (1995) compare the effects of women's education on divorce in these three countries and hypothesize that in countries where the divorce rate is low, the liberating effect of education will be strong because "in such societies, marital disruption represents a more severe violation of an established social norm" (p. 202; see also Hoem, 1997 Although their interpretation is more specific than ours, the interaction effect they find is consistent with our view that women's economic independence more strongly affects divorce in more culturally traditional settings. A last piece of evidence on interaction effects comes from a study by Brines and Joyner (1999) In this study, we test the interaction hypothesis in a new way. We link employment variables to a series of individual cultural indicators, and we examine how these sets of variables-by themselves and in interaction-affect divorce. We use retrospective data so that we are able to cover a wide range of marriage cohorts: marriages that were formed in the past five decades. At the outset, we make clear that we rely on behavioral proxies to measure women's gender ideologies in the past. Because the retrospective design we are using makes direct measures of past attitudes unreliable, we developed a set of alternative behavioral measures that are plausible indicators of values.
The research literature has pointed to a range of social and structural variables that affect divorce probabilities. Research has shown that religion has a strong negative effect on divorce (Lehrer & Chiswick, 1993) . The presence of children reduces the chances of divorce (Waite & Lillard, 1991) . Persons who cohabited with their partners before marriage are generally more likely to experience a divorce (Brines & Joyner, 1999) . Persons who married at a young age often have been found to have a higher divorce risk (Tzeng & Mare, 1995) . The risk of divorce is increased if the parents of the respondent divorced when the respondent was young (Wolfinger, 1999) . Finally, American researc points to ethnic and racial differences in th divorce risks (Raschke, 1987 (Kalmijn & De Graaf, 1998) . We first made a selection of 19 municipalities that are representative of the Dutch population with respect to region and urbanization. From the population registers of these municipalities, the following three random samples were drawn: (a) persons in their first marriage, (b) divorced persons who were not remarried, and (c) divorced persons who were remarried. Stratifying was possible because municipalities in The Netherlands have information on current and past marital status of their inhabitants. Because we stratified the sample, we could oversample divorced persons, and this made it possible to study the determinants of divorce with a normal-size survey. Note that the oversample increases the proportion of divorced persons in the sample. Oversampling of the divorced will not affect the results when comparing the proportion of divorced persons between categories, however. In other words, the intercept will change due to oversampling, but the effects will not change. Our data do not allow us to analyze the risk of separation for persons who are cohabiting. The population registers do not contain information about cohabitation, only marital status. In the interview, we did ask questions about whether couples cohabited before they got married, and we also asked about cohabitation after divorce.
We limited the original sample of persons, who are either married or separated from a marriage, to first marriages (i.e., either in a first marriage or divorced from a first marriage). We include premarital cohabitation as a control variable. As is the case in most retrospective surveys, data on former spouses were obtained from respondent reports. This reduces the amount of information we were able to obtain on the former spouse.
Although we have full work histories for respondents, we have only partial histories for former spouses. Because women's labor force participation is central to the current analysis, we therefore limited our sample to female respondents.
The total sample size consists of 1,356 women, 1,073 of whom experienced a divorce.
We use discrete-time event-history analysis to assess the causes of divorce (Yamaguchi, 1991) .
This method allows the use of covariates that change over time. It is flexible in the type of duration dependency one models, it requires a data matrix that is easy to construct (a personperiod file), and it leads to a simple logistic regression model for the conditional probability of divorce. Discrete time models are good approximations of continuous time models as long as the time intervals are not too large (Yamaguchi). The same models have been used by South (2001) and Brines and Joyner (1999) , for example. We use years as our interval. The dependent variable refers to the timing of separation-that is, when the couple stopped living together. Duration dependency is assessed by using the number of years the marriage has existed, as well as the number of years squared.
Including both terms fits the data best.
We constructed a person-period file starting with the year of marriage and ending with the survey year (if still married) or the separation year (if divorced). After excluding personperiods with missing values on central characteristics (year of separation, year of marriage, and timing of employment), we were left with data on 1,289 women, 1,011 of whom were divorced. The women in our sample got married at some point between 1943 and 1997. The earliest divorce occurred in 1949, the last divorce occurred in the interview year, 1998. Descriptive statistics of all independent variables are in Table 2 .
Measures of Economic Variables
Measures of work and schooling are obtained from full work and schooling histories for the Husband's paid work hours: variable indicating how many hours the husband worked, obtained from a partial work history (his employment at the onset of marriage or cohabitation and his employment five years after the beginning of marriage or cohabitation). The number of hours is calculated as the mean of these two variables.
Husband's schooling: the highest level of completed schooling, obtained from a single question, measured on an ordinal scale, from 1 for elementary to 7 for university (same as wife's schooling).
Measures of Cultural Variables
Most earlier studies of cultural effects use standard attitude items to measure an individual's gender ideology. These studies either have prospective data where attitudes are measured in the early waves of the panel (e.g., Greenstein, 1995) or rely on cross-sectional data and relate current attitudes to current perceptions of the quality of marriage (e.g., Lye & Biblarz, 1993) . In this study, we are unable to use standard attitude measures because we rely on retrospective data.
In a retrospective design, valid measures of values are difficult to obtain because life course experiences may change how people perceive their earlier attitudes. For that reason, we look at concrete behaviors in the past that reflect emancipatory attitudes. We believe that reports about behaviors in the past will be less biased than reports about prior attitudes. We asked women to indicate whether they did the following things in the first years of the marriage:
Read books about women's liberation: often (10%), sometimes (17%), or almost never (74%). Attended meetings about women's liberation: often (3%), sometimes (5%), or almost never (92%).
Read books about self-actualization or new age:
often (12%), sometimes (14%), or almost never (74%). Attended meetings about self-actualization or new age: often (4%), sometimes (5%), or almost never (91%). Voted for far-left political parties: usually voted for these parties (12%). Which surname was used: surname of the husband (59%), only own surname (14%), both surnames (27%).
We constructed an index by counting the number of positive scores on all of the items. For the first four items, often and sometimes count as a positive score. For the last item, using both surnames and using only one's own surname count as a positive score. The resulting index has a sufficient degree of reliability (alpha = .66). The index can be regarded as an indirect measure of the degree to which the wife was oriented toward emancipatory values. Because the index is skewed, with few women scoring on all six items, the index was converted to percentile scores. We also experimented with a simple dichotomy, but this yielded no different results.
A possible criticism of our items is that they are historically specific. The women's movement in The Netherlands became popular in the 1960s, so few women before that time could have responded affirmatively to these items. We do not think that this is a problem, however, because the rise of the women's movement is to a large extent the result of a change in values in the population. A similar argument can be made for books about women's liberation: Their availability reflects the demand for such books, and that demand is part of the concept we are considering here.
Measures of Control Variables
Period: the current year in which the couple is at risk. We tested whether the effect is nonlinear, but this turned out not to be the case.
The presence of children: a set of time-varying covariates, indicating whether the couple had children aged 0-5, 6-12, 13-18, or over 18; couples without children are the reference group.
Parental divorce: whether the parents of the wife were divorced when she was growing up.
Marrying young: whether the wife married before age 21.
Premarital cohabitation: variable indicating whether the wife cohabited with her (former) spouse before marrying (coded 1).
Religiosity: whether the woman was a member of a church when she was 14 years of age.
Caribbean ethnicity: whether the wife or (Table 3 ).
The period effect shows the well-documented increase in the divorce rate since the 1960s. Couples with children have a lower divorce rate than couples without children. The protective effect is lower for older children than for younger children.
For couples with children older than 13 years, the divorce risk is the same as for couples without children. This age pattern has been found in American studies as well, and points to the reduced social costs of divorce for men and economic costs for women when the children are somewhat older, and to the possibility that parents in troublesome marriages with very young children postpone divorce (Waite & Lillard, 1991) . Having divorced parents increases the conditional odds of divorce by 27%, which is a substantial effect (exponent of .240). Intergenerational transmission of divorce has been found in many studies (e.g., Wolfinger, 1999) , and our data show that this phenomenon occurs in The Netherlands as well. We also find that marrying at a young age increases the odds of although the effect is modest (20%) with earlier research (Brines & Joyner we find that couples who cohabited prior riage have a higher risk of divorce th couples. The effect is substantial (29%). who attended church when living at h 20% less likely to divorce than other w which is also consistent with other studies (Lehrer & Chiswick, 1993) . Finally, we see that women with Caribbean origins (coming from Suriname or the Netherlands Antilles) are more Women with modem attitudes about gender-as reflected in participation in women's liberation groups, using one's maiden name, voting for farleft political parties, and so on-have a higher risk of divorce than more traditional women. The effect is substantial in size: The risk of divorce is 52% higher for the most progressive women than for the most traditional women. is that women in these couples have more attractive labor market resources: They more often work for pay and are more highly educated. Adding cultural variables has a weaker effect on the change in the cohabitation effect. Prior research often has argued that the positive premarital cohabitation effect is due to cohabiters having different values (Axinn & Thornton, 1992 ), but our analysis shows that in The Netherlands, this selectivity explanation is less important than the economic explanation, at least when selection is measured by gender attitudes. To test our hypothesis that wife's labor market resources have weaker (less disruptive) effects for couples in which the wife holds more emancipatory attitudes, we estimated interaction models ( Table 4 ). Note that we only interact the ables. We present results for three groups: the most liberal, the most traditional, and the average group of women. We plot the odds of divorce for nonworking women, part-time working women, and full-time working women. The absolute level of the odds is not important because the survey contains an oversample of ever-divorced persons.
Model D in
As Figure 1 shows, the differences in the effects are substantial. Women's employment increases the odds of divorce substantially, but only for more traditional women, not for more liberal women. Part-time work seems to have a slight tendency to be more disruptive for more modern women, but these deviations are small. Interesting in Figure 1 is that the main effect of emancipatory values is incorporated as well. We see that more liberal women only have a higher odds of divorce when they are not employed full time. Among full-time working women, traditional and ing difference concerns the effect of women's education. Whereas we find a positive effect of women's education on divorce, American studies generally find that divorce is more common among lower socioeconomic groups (Raschke, 1987) , and this is also true when women's education is used as an indicator of socioeconomic status (e.g., Ono, 1998; South, 2001 The interaction effect we find is partly consistent with what has been found in the few previous studies on this issue. Although American studies that directly tested for interaction effects (e.g., Greenstein, 1995; Sayer & Bianchi, 2000) lend only weak or even negative support for a less disruptive influence of wife's labor market resources among egalitarian women, the interaction effect we find is consistent with a recent American analysis in which egalitarian labor force patterns between men and women appear detrimental only in marriage and not in cohabiting relationships (Brines & Joyner, 1999) . The interaction effect also is consistent with the finding that the disruptive effect of women's education on divorce is stronger in more traditional European countries than in more modern European countries (Blossfeld et al., 1995) . Our findings are less consistent with a recent analysis by South (2001) , which shows that the effects of women's working hours in the United States are stronger in recent periods than in earlier periods.
From our findings, we would expect that a modem division of labor in marriage will be less detrimental in the recent, more liberal era.
In this respect, our findings are more in line with studies outside the United States, which have found a decline in the disruptive influence of wife's work over time (e.g., Bracher et al., 1993; Wagner, 1997) . Our findings suggest that economic theories of marriage are only conditionally true, which in turn implies that declining specialization is not necessarily detrimental to the future of marriage.
The important role of cultural factors in divorce has been demonstrated in a somewhat unusual way in our study. Because we rely on retrospective data, we used alternative behavioral and contextual measures to measure values, such as participation in women's liberation groups, using one's maiden name, and voting for leftwing parties, all referring to the early period of marriage. We argued that these variables are a reflection of women's past emancipatory values. Although some authors would argue that using behavior to measure attitudes is problematic, we believe that our approach is in line with the revealed preference approach often advocated in economics. We note that a similar approach has been used, although often implicitly, in analyses of the relationship between religiosity and demographic behavior. Many demographers use church membership, for example, to measure religious values (e.g., Lehrer & Chiswick, 1993) .
Even if one accepts the behavioral approach to measuring values, one can have concerns about the validity of the cultural index because our design is retrospective. Perhaps some women who experienced a divorce have become more strongly opposed to traditional family values. Such changes can lead to a biased view of the past. People generally have a preference for being consistent in their views, and this may create incentives to bring reports of past attitudes into line with current attitudes. In the present case, this would mean that divorced women will have a more liberal view of themselves in the past than married women, and this will bias the effects of our cultural index. There are three reasons that we do not believe that this is an important threat to our conclusions. First, the argument is true only when the assumption is valid that divorce has an independent effect on women's family values. Second, we asked about behaviors in the past and we believe it is more difficult to give a distorted view of past behavior than of past attitudes. Third, if there is bias, it probably has a greater influence on the main effect of the cultural index than on the interaction effect we found.
Our findings are compatible with one of the most common explanations for the rising divorce rate in the Western world, including The Netherlands. Given the destabilizing effect of women's work and schooling, the increase in women's labor force participation and educational level offers a plausible explanation for the increase in the divorce rate (Cherlin, 1992 ). Yet our findings also suggest that this explanation is losing some of its power. The gender attitudes of the Dutch population have become increasingly progressive and egalitarian, and this study shows that, for women with progressive attitudes, women's labor force participation does not increase the risk of divorce. An important implication of this finding is that even though female employment rates may continue to increase, the increase in the divorce rate may decline or even end.
From an international perspective, differences in women's labor market and educational resources probably do not offer a sufficient explanation for the differences in divorce rates among countries. The labor force participation rate of Dutch women used to be relatively low, 
